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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MISTRIAL IN ABSENCE OF
LEGAL ERROR HELD DUE PROCESS
A., B., and C. were indicted for assault. A. and B., tried together, were convicted. Before judgments were entered, C. was
brought to trial; A. and B. being called as witnesses for the prosecution. When they successfully invoked the privilege against selfincrimination, the prosecutor obtained a mistrial so that he would
later be able to use their testimony. In a subsequent trial of C.,
the testimony of A. and B. was introduced in evidence. Held:
Conviction affirmed. C. was not denied the essentials of a fair
trial in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Brock v. State
of North Carolina,73 S. Ct. 349 (1953).
While the concept of double jeopardy cannot be exactly defined for all purposes, it is generally held that jeopardy attaches
when a person is regularly charged with a crime before a tribunal
properly organized and competent to try him, i. e., when the jury
is impanelled and sworn. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100
(1904); Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F. 2d 435 (5th Cir. 1940); State
v. Kinghorn, 56 Wash. 131, 105 Pac. 234 (1909); of. Clawans v.
Rives, 104 F. 2d 240 (D. C. Cir. 1909); State v. Yokum, 155 La.
846, 99 So. 621 (1923), which require that a witness be sworn before jeopardy attaches. When a trial is discontinued, the question
arises whether a subsequent trial of the defendant would subject
him to double jeopardy within the prohibition of the doctrine.
According to United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U. S. 1824),
the court has "the authority to discharge a jury from giving a
verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances
into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or
See
the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated."
Thompson v. United States, 155 U. S.274 (1894) ; Wade v. Hunter,
336 U. S. 684 (1949); People ex rel. Brinkman v. Barr. 248 N. Y.
126, 161 N. E. 444 (1928).
To lay down a precise rule for determining when a discharge
will be deemed "necessary" would seem to be impossible. A discharge of the jury has been said to be no bar to a second trial
where: (1) the jury was discharged because it could not agree,
United States v. Perez, supra; (2) one of the petit jurors was a
member of the grand jury which returned the indictment, Thomipson v. United States, supra; (3) essential witnesses were urgently
needed to aid in the prosecution of a war, Wade v. Hunter,supra;
(4) the presiding judge became ill and could not continue, People
ex rel. Brinkman v. Barr, supra; (5) one of the jurors was found
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to be insane, United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas. 207, No. 15,
321 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1823). See A. L. I., ADmImSTRATION OF THE
CGL
RIm-AL L w 72 (Tent. Draft 1935).
However a discharge of
the jury was held to be a bar to a second prosecution where: (1)
a witness failed to return from recess, State v. Little, 120 W. Va.
213, 197 S. E. 626 (1938); (2) there was insufficient evidence to
prosecute, People v. Barrett, 2 Caines 304 (N. Y. 1805); (3) merely
as a matter of convenience, the trial judge withdrew from the indictment several counts included in a subsequent trial, United
States v. Kraut, 2 F. Supp. 16 (S. D. N. Y. 1932); (4) defendant's
counsel, disregarding a warning against such remarks, stated that
the prosecuting witness was being "forced" to testify, Armen-trout v. State, 214 Ind. 273, 15 N. E. 2d 363 (1938); (5) the district attorney failed to subpoena his two material witnesses and
was unable to proceed in their absence, Cornero v. United States,
48 F. 2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931). See A. L. I., ADMINISTRATION OF THE
CRniMNAL LAw 87 (Tent. Draft 1935).
The "test" whether a particular right falls within the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
whether restriction of the right "violates a principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people as to be
ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97,
105 (1934). The protection against double jeopardy provided by
the Fifth Amendment has been said not to be one of the fundamental rights coming within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Arnrine v. Tines, 131 F. 2d 827 (10th Cir. 1942). In Palco
v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), the question of the extent to
which the Fourteenth Amendment provides protection against
double jeopardy was before the Supreme Court. In that case,
defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, the state
on appeal obtained a new trial on the ground of legal error, and
on retrial defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree.
However, the Court specifically avoided discussing the consequences of the retrial in case the proceedings were free from legal
error. Supra at 328.
Unlike the Palko case, supra, there was no legal error in the
instant case. The only ground for discharge of the jury here was
to aid the prosecution's case. If the reasoning of the majority
in the principal case were followed, the defendant might conceivably be subjected to a multitude of trials. The doctrine against
double jeopardy was developed to prevent just that type of practice. Furthermore, the delay may weaken the defendant's case.
Perhaps the limitations suggested by Frankfurter, J., in his concurring opinion would provide the necessary safeguards. He indicated that a court cannot rightfully discharge a jury "merely
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in order to allow a prosecutor who has been incompetent, or casual, or even ineffective to see if he cannot do better a second time."
Brock v. State of North Carolina,supra at 351.
Irwin N. Davis.
WIZ-NO ELECTION BETWEEN LEGACY AND
QUANTUM MERUIT
Decedent orally promised to leave his five hundred acre farm
to the plaintiffs if they would stay with him until he died. Plaintiffs devoted thirty-six years to the development of decedent's
prqperty. Decedent failed to devise the property but left the
plaintiffs a $30,000 legacy, which they accepted. Held: Although
recovery for the breach of an oral contract was barred by the
Statute of Frauds, recovery was possible in quantum meruit for
Mass.
the value of plaintiffs' services. Turner v. White, (1952).
155
E.
2d
N.
109
The enforceability of agreements to make wills is governed
by the law of contracts. Emery v. Darling,50 Ohio 160, 33 N. E.
715 (1893). Promises to devise realty are within the section of the
Statute of Frauds relating to the transfer of interests in land.
In re Sheldon's Estate, 120 Wis. 26, 97 N. W. 524 (1903). Ordinarily a contract to will property is breached by the failure of the
promisor to execute any will, Mills v. Smith, 193 Mass. 11, 78 N. E.
765 (1906), or by leaving a will with terms contrary to the contract. Phalenv. U. S. Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 78 N. E. 943 (1906).
The breach occurs upon the testator's death, Warden v. Hinds,
163 Fed. 201 (4th Cir. 1908), unless he repudiates the
contract during his lifetime. Carterv. Witherspoon, 156 Miss. 597,
126 So. 388 (1930). Upon the breach of an enforceable contract to
make a will, the promisee can recover damages measured by the
value of the property. Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 Pac. 542
(1920). Where the oral contract is unenforceable, barring recovery of damages on the contract, the promisee may still recover for the reasonable value of services rendered to the deceased. Robinson v. Raynor, 28 N. Y. 494 (1864); Hensley v.
Hilton, 191 Ind.309, 131 N. E. 38 (1921). In the instant case the
Massachusetts court allowed a recovery in quantum meruit to prevent the Statute of Frauds from being used to allow a defendant
to receive valuable services without paying compensation.
Downey v. Union Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405, 45 N. E. 2d 373 (1942).
Granting the right to recover in quantum meruit, defendant
claimed that the acceptance of the legacy barred the action. The
defense relied on the principle that a person cannot take a benefit

